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MAKING ROOM AT THE INN: RENT
CONTROL AS A REGULATORY TAKING
I. INTRODUCTION
Numerous states and localities have passed rent control laws' to sta-
bilize rents and prevent landlord "profiteering" during times of rental
unit shortages. Although rent control systems differ,2 their common
purpose is to maintain rents below market levels.' Landowners have
challenged rent control laws on several constitutional grounds. One
such ground is the fifth amendment's just compensation clause which
proscribes uncompensated government usurpation of property rights
for public use.' In Pennel v. City of San Jose,5 for example, the United
States Supreme Court responded to the just compensation challenge
1. See Baar, Guidelines for Drafting Rent Control Laws: Lessons of a Decade, 35
RtrrGERs L. REv. 723, 725-728 and n.1 (1983) for estimates of the extent of rent con-
trol as of 1983. More than ten percent of residential rental units in the U.S. were sub-
ject to rent control at that time. Id. at 725 n. 1. Rent control laws were effective in New
York City, the greater Boston area, over 100 New Jersey municipalities, Washington,
D.C., Miami Beach, municipalities throughout California, and other localities. Id. at
727-28 and nn.7-16.
2. See generally Baar, supra note 1, for an extensive review of the types of rent
control laws.
3. See Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 741, 746 (1988) (every rent control law insures that the rents are kept below
fair market rental of the property).
4. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part that "private property [shall not]
be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth
amendment applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See Chicago, B &
Q R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897) (private property taken by the state for
public use without compensation violates the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment).
5. 485 U.S. 99 (1988), aff'g 42 Cal. 3d 365, 721 P.2d 1111, 228 Cal. Rptr. 726
(1986).
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and held that rent control laws do not constitute "takings" 6 when the
laws merely protect tenants from "burdensome rent increases" and al-
low landlords a "reasonable" return on investment.7
This Recent Development first reviews regulatory taking jurispru-
dence. With this foundation it then reviews the case law where land-
lords have challenged rent control as an unconstitutional taking.
Then, it criticizes courts' continuing use of economic substantive due
process as an element of regulatory taking analysis. Finally, the author
departs from established precedent to conclude that rent control laws
are uncompensated takings and therefore unconstitutional.
II. THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF REGULATORY
TAKING ANALYSIS
The just compensation clause prohibits the taking of private prop-
erty for public use without compensating the deprived property
owner.8 The typical takings claim arises when government, exercising
its power of eminent domain,9 physically seizes property for public
use.1° A taking may also occur when government exercises its police
power11 by enacting building or zoning ordinances. 2 Although gov-
6. The convention is to use the word "taking" in quotation marks to indicate regu-
latory takings in which the government does not actually take possession of the land.
The author discontinues this use of quotation marks after the first few such uses.
7. 485 U.S. at 113.
8. See supra note 4.
9. Eminent domain is the government's power to appropriate, within constitutional
constraints, private property for public use. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 109 U.S.
513, 518 (1883) (The power to take private property for public use, termed eminent
domain, is an incident of sovereignty. It requires no constitutional grant, but is limited
by the fifth amendment).
10. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles
County, 482 U.S. 304, 316 (1987) (the typical taking occurs when government con-
demns property within its eminent domain power); United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S.
253, 257 (1980) (condemnation proceeding typically involves action by condemnor to
effect taking and acquire title).
11. The police power is the power inherent in a sovereign government to "direct the
activities of persons within its jurisdiction." See Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings and
Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057, 1057 (1980). Implicit in the concept of
police power is the idea that government shall only exercise the power to advance the
public interest. Id. A court will declare a regulatory measure void if found to be "arbi-
trary, capricious, or unreasonable." Id. at 1058. In the context of the regulatory tak-
ings issue, courts will apply a "means-ends" or "rationally related" test in varying
degrees where the court questions whether the regulation serves a legitimate public pur-
pose and, if so, whether the means reasonably relate to that purpose. See, e.g., East
Coast Lumber Terminal v. Town of Babylon, 174 F.2d 106, 110-11 (2d Cir. 1949) ("un-
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ernment does not acquire title to the property, owners contend that the
restrictions constitute de facto takings because they limit the property's
use and diminish its value.13
The United States Supreme Court has recognized regulatory takings
since its 1922 decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.14 In
Mahon, a coal company conveyed the surface rights to its property but
reasonable" conditions imposed upon use of land, even though not an "out and out
taking," is unconstitutional if accomplished without compensation); Hulen v. City of
Corsicana, 65 F.2d 969, 970 (5th Cir. 1933), cert denied, 290 U.S. 662 (the court's duty
is to determine the reasonableness of the police power exercise); Delaware, L & W. R.
Co. v. Mayor of Morristown, 14 F.2d 257, 259 (3d Cir. 1926), rev'd on other grounds,
276 U.S. 182 (1928) (the test as to whether a land use regulation is a taking depends on
the reasonableness of the exercise of the police power, as justified by public necessity);
Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 97 F. Supp. 307, 314 (N.D. Ohio 1924), rev'don
other grounds, 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (a court may sustain a law or ordinance only if it has
a "real and substantial relation to the maintenance and preservation of the public peace,
public order, public morals, or public safety"). For a critique of the continuing use of
this means-ends inquiry, termed substantive due process, see infra notes 132-43 and
accompanying text.
12. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), discussed infra notes
14-18 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 24-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the approaches
courts use to determine whether a particular land use regulation is a "taking." Courts
frequently use the phrase "inverse condemnation" to describe those cases in which a
landowner attempts to recover compensation for a taking when the government has
neither condemned the property nor acquired title. See, eg., Thornburg v. Port of Port-
land, 233 Or. 178, 180 n.1, 376 P.2d 100, 101 n.l (1962) ("inverse condemnation is a
cause of action against a government defendant to recover the value of property which
has been taken in fact by the government defendant, even though no formal exercise of
the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency.").
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987), some state courts refused to
hold that temporary land use regulations may constitute takings requiring compensa-
tion. Rather, such courts would hold either that the regulation was a "reasonable"
exercise of the police power, and therefore no compensation was due, or, if the court
found an "unreasonable" or "excessive" exercise of the police power, the court would
invalidate the regulation, facially or as applied. See, eg., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24
Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), aff'd on other grounds, 447 U.S.
255 (1980) (a landowner may not transmute excessive police power exercise into a law-
ful taking); Fred F. French Inv., Inc., v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 593, 350
N.E.2d 381, 384, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 8 (1976) (distinguishing compensable taking and non-
compensable regulation).
In First English, the Supreme Court held that, where the government has already
worked a taking, no subsequent action can relieve the government of the duty to com-
pensate the landowner for the period during which the taking was effective. 482 U.S. at
319.
14. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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expressly reserved the right to mine the underlying coal. 5 Subse-
quently, the state legislature enacted a statute prohibiting the mining of
coal in such a way as to threaten subsidence of houses and other struc-
tures. A holder of surface rights attempted to enjoin the coal com-
pany's underground mining based on this legislation. 6 The Court held
that the statute caused an unconstitutional taking.'7 Justice Holmes,
writing for the majority, stated that "[t]he general rule at least is, that
while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes
too far it will be recognized as a taking."'"
The Mahon Court, however, failed to define when a regulation "goes
too far," and thereby creates an unconstitutional taking. Conse-
quently, Mahon has spawned a number of formulae and ad hoc ap-
proaches that courts use to determine when a land use regulation
becomes a taking.19
Despite the different formulae, all regulatory taking analysis begins
with a substantive due process2' inquiry. The court, applying varying
15. Id at 412.
16. Id
17. Id. at 413. The Court recognized that, although the police power may limit
property rights and the values incident to property, the constitutional provisions of due
process and contract limit the police power. One factor to consider in determining such
limits is diminution in value of the property. "When [diminution in property value]
reaches a certain magnitude... there must be an exercise of eminent domain and
compensation...." Id.
18. Id. at 415. Holmes went on to say "that a strong public desire to improve the
public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the
constitutional way of paying for the change." Id. at 416.
19. One author described the decisions concerning regulatory takings as "character-
ized by confusing and incompatible results, often explained in conclusionary terminol-
ogy, circular reasoning, and empty rhetoric." Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by
Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1, 2
(1971). See Note, Just Compensation For Temporary Regulatory Takings: A Discussion
of Factors Influencing Damage Awards, 35 EMORY L.J. 729, 738 nn.48-49 (1986)
(whether a land use regulation rises to a taking depends on the facts of each case); Note,
Just Compensation: The Constitutionally Required Remedy for Regulatory Takings, 55
U. CIN. L. Rnv. 1237, 1245 nn.60-63 (1986-87) (state courts have adopted various ap-
proaches to resolve regulatory taking cases); Developments in the Law--Zoning, 91
HARV. L. REv. 1427, 1464 n.9 (1978) (survey of recent case law reveals a lack of any
universally accepted mode of deciding regulatory takings). See also Goldblatt v. Town
of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) (no set formula to determine where regulation
ends and takings begin); Penn Central Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,
124 (1978) (no "set formula" for determining when economic injuries caused by public
action require compensation by government).
20. As originally understood, the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments dealt only with procedural rights. The fifth amendment states: "No per-
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levels of scrutiny,21 asks whether the ends of the regulation are legiti-
son shall be... deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; ...."
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fourteenth amendment states: "No state shall... deprive
any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; .... ." U.S. CONsT.
amend. XIV.
"Due process of law" originally meant that government processes must be fair and
non-arbitrary. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (non-arbitrary);
Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1212 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)
(fairness). On occasion, courts have used the due process clause to invalidate govern-
ment actions based on the fairness of the substance rather than the fairness of the pro-
cess. See E. CoRwiN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 114 (1948) (the due process
clause consecrated a mode of procedure, but increasingly reached substantive content of
legislation). Essentially, under the substantive due process doctrine, courts review the
substance of legislation to determine if the law furthers a legitimate state interest. See,
e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56-57 (1905) (the due process clauses of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments protect liberty of contract and private property against
unwarranted government interferences).
This doctrine, when applied to private economic interests, greatly expanded constitu-
tional protection to these interests. Today, economic substantive due process review
tends to be extremely lenient and deferential to the challenged laws. See, e.g., Hodel v.
Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331-33 (1981) (various lenient tests are articulated in combined
discussion of equal protection and substantive due process issues); Usery v. Turner Elk-
horn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (legislative acts adjusting burdens and benefits
of economic life come to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality); Ferguson
v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) (rejecting substantive due process doctrine). But see
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n., 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (overturning land use regu-
lation on substantive due process grounds), discussed infra notes 30-36 and accompany-
ing text.
Substantive due process doctrine, however, survives as a powerful judicial "veto" of
legislation when the issues are non-economic and involve privacy, personhood and fam-
ily. See, ag., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485 (1965) (legitimate ends do not
justify means that invade protected freedoms, and thus, a law which prohibits use of
contraceptives is invalid); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (laws regulating abortion
are invalid, based on constitutional privacy right recognized in Griswold). These cases
do not apply substantive due process by name, but are nevertheless widely considered to
be substantive due process decisions. See M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE
COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL POLICY-MAKING BY THE JUDICIARY 115, 117-18 (1982) (substantive due pro-
cess labeled constitution's "perennial hobgoblin"); Karst, The Freedom of Intimate
Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 664-66 (1980) (the Court is reluctant to admit the role of
substantive due process in the new right of privacy). See generally G. GUNTHER, CON-
SITTIONAL LAW 501-59 (11th ed. 1985) (placing discussion of these cases within
chapter on substantive due process); G. STONE, CONSTITUTONAL LAW 840-95 (1986)
(placing discussion of these cases within chapter on substantive due process).
21. The court, when making a substantive due process inquiry, applies various
"levels of scrutiny" to the challenged law. The level of scrutiny that the Court applies
depends on the private interest upon which the law impinges. The more important or
"fundamental" the interest, the more demanding is the Court's means-ends inquiry.
The least intensive judicial review occurs under the rationality standard. Under this
standard, the court inquires whether the law is rationally related to a legitimate govern-
1990]
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mate or important and, if so, whether the means justify those ends.
Courts generally invalidate a land use regulation if the ends sought are
"arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable," or if the means are not ration-
ally related to its ends.22
If a regulation comports with substantive due process analysis,
courts then apply one of four tests to determine whether its impact on
the landowner's interests qualify it as a taking.23 Those tests include
ment purpose. The courts generally apply the rationality standard to economic regula-
tions. See, eg., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934) (due process demands
only that laws regulating property and contract rights select a means having a real and
substantial relation to the end, and the end is not "arbitrary, capricious, or unreasona-
ble). It is rare today that the Court will overturn economic legislation under the ration-
ality standard. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTrUTIONAL LAW 356
(3rd ed. 1986) [hereinafter NOWAK]. See, eg., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S.
483, 488 (1955). ('The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause [to]
strike down state laws, regulation of business and industrial conditions, because they
may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.");
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952) ("[W]e do not sit as a
super-legislature.... [The] state legislatures ... may within extremely broad limits
control practices in the business-labor field .. "). See also G. GUNTHER, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 540 (10th ed. 1980) (the Court applies a "hands off" approach to eco-
nomic substantive due process challenges).
Although the Court has deferred to the legislatures on economic matters, a stricter
substantive due process analysis is available to protect individual liberties or "funda-
mental" rights. Where a fundamental right is involved, the Court applies "heightened"
or "strict" scrutiny, in which the law's proponents must show that the law is "neces-
sary" to protect a compelling state interest. See NOWAK, supra at 357; see also Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (legitimate ends do not justify means that
invade protected freedoms, and thus a law which prohibits use of contraceptives is inva-
lid).
In Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n., 483 U.S. 825 (1987), Justice Scalia, writing
for the majority, pointed out that in the takings field, the level of scrutiny is not simple
rational relation. The Court has required that the regulation "substantially advance"
the "legitimate state interest." Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). This
formula appears to be intermediate level scrutiny, requiring a closer nexus between the
ends and the means than required by simple rational basis review, yet not requiring the
"compelling" state interest of strict scrutiny.
22. See supra note 20 for examples of cases that turn on substantive due process
inquiry.
23. For a similar view of regulatory takings analysis, see Stoebuck, supra note 11, at
1058. Stoebuck views the "unreasonable" part of the "arbitrary, capricious, or unrea-
sonable" test as the broadest of the three terms, involving a three part inquiry: 1) does
the regulation serve a public end or purpose?; 2) if so, are the means adopted reasonably
necessary to attain that end?; 3) are the means unduly oppressive upon the persons
regulated? Id. This Recent Development separates the substantive due process inquiry,
Stoebuck's first and second prong, from the "takings" test, Stoebuck's third prong, for
two reasons. First, the courts rarely overturn economic regulations based on the sub-
stantive due process inquiry. See supra note 20. Second, it seems logical that a land use
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol38/iss1/14
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the physical invasion test, the noxious use test, the balancing test and
the diminution in value test.
A. Physical Invasion Test
The physical invasion test applies to traditional eminent domain tak-
ings. It also includes indirect government intrusions on a claimant's
land when, for example, the government builds a dam that floods the
claimant's land.24
The Supreme Court has invariably found that the government's
physical invasion on a claimant's land is a taking. Two Supreme Court
regulation can be "reasonable," yet still result in a taking as applied to a particular
landowner. See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los
Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (land use regulation, though reasonable, is a tak-
ing where the regulation denies virtually all use of property).
The fifth amendment, after all, contemplates "reasonable" government takings: No
matter how reasonable the taking, just compensation is due. Stoebuck's analysis sug-
gests that only "unreasonable" regulations can be takings.
24. See, eg., Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 174-84 (1871)
(compensation required where dam constructed under statute caused flooding of plain-
tiff's land); Department of Pub. Works & Bldgs. v. Wilson & Co., 62 Ill. 2d 131, 141,
340 N.E.2d 12, 17 (1975) ("right of access" is a private property right inherent in real
estate, and when action of the state eliminates or materially impairs access, compensa-
tion is due the landowner); Seawall Associates v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, -,
542 N.E.2d 1059, 1063-64, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542, 546-47 (1989) (a case for compensation
occurs when government, through its agents or the public at large, regularly uses or
occupies space or a thing which theretofore was under private ownership); Helix Land
Co., Inc., v. City of San Diego, 82 Cal. App. 3d 932, 945, 147 Cal. Rptr. 683, 690 (1978)
(compensable taking requires a physical invasion or direct legal restraint); Nueces
County Drainage & Conservation Dist. No. 2 v. Bevly, 519 S.W.2d 938, 943 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1975) ("taking" means an actual physical invasion or an appropriation of land);
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n., 483 U.S. 825, 832 (1987) (physical invasion oc-
curs where government grants the public a right to traverse private property). Compare
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (city had to pay
compensation when it authorized cable television company to place its wires and
switchboxes on private property without consent of owner) with FCC v. Florida Power
Corp., 480 U.S. 245 (1987) (FCC regulation of rates chargeable by utility companies for
rental of utility pole space to cable television companies was not a "taking" because the
regulations did not require the utilities to rent pole space, and therefore, there was no
physical occupation).
In Mahon, supra notes 14-18, the Court implicitly rejected the physical invasion test
as the sole measure of a taking. The Court held that a land use regulation involving no
physical occupation still gave rise to a taking. However, in Penn. Central Trans. Co. v.
City of New York, 438 U.S.104 (1978), the Court declared: "We do not embrace the
proposition that a 'taking' can never occur unless government has transferred physical
control over a portion of a parcel." 438 U.S. at 122 n.25.
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cases, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp. 25 and Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission,26 illustrate the Court's strict applica-
tion of the physical invasion test. In Loretto the New York legislature
enacted a law prohibiting landlords from interfering with the installa-
tion of cable television facilities on the landlord's property.27 The
landlord who challenged the law argued that the cable company's in-
stallations on her property represented an unconstitutional taking
without just compensation.28 The Court reasoned that the cable com-
pany's installations on the landlord's property was a physical occupa-
tion and therefore a per se taking.2 9
The Supreme Court has also found a physical invasion when govern-
ment authorizes temporary public access to private property. In Nol-
lan 30 the purchasers of an ocean-front lot located between two public
beaches sought permission from the California Coastal Commission
(CCC) to replace the existing bungalow with a larger home.31 The
CCC granted a permit on the condition that the landowners' give the
public an ocean-front easement across their land to assure public ac-
cess.32 The landowners challenged the condition as an unconstitu-
tional taking.33
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that the easement
25. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
26. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
27. 458 U.S. at 423 n.3 (citing New York Exec. Law § 828 (McKinney Supp. 1981-
1982)).
28. Id. at 424. The plaintiff's case was a class action on behalf of all owners of real
property in the state on whose land Teleprompter had placed CATV components pur-
suant to § 828 of the Executive Law. Id. The New York Supreme Court, Special Term,
granted summary judgment to the cable company and intervenor City. Id at 424. The
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed. Id. The
landlord appealed to the Court of Appeals of New York, which affirmed, holding that
the law was reasonably related to a legitimate public purpose, that the regulation did
not have an excessive economic impact on the landlord's investment-backed expecta-
tions, and that physical appropriations are not per se taldngs. Id. at 424-25.
29. Id. at 426, 434-35. Physical invasion remains the strongest taking case, usually
triggering aperse rule for compensation. See Michelson, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation Law," 80 HARV. L. REv.
1165, 1184 (1967) ("The one incontestable case for compensation ... seems to occur
when the government deliberately brings it about that its agents, or the public at large,
'regularly' use, or 'permanently' occupy," private property.).
30. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
31. Id. at 827-28.
32. Id at 828.
33. Id. at 829.
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amounted to a "permanent physical occupation" of the land by the
public "passing to and fro ... even though no particular individual is
permitted to station himself permanently upon the premises."34 Even
though the easement may not have significantly impaired the value of
the land, as Justice Brennan argued in dissent,35 the Court nevertheless
held that trivial intrusions by individuals with government-granted ac-
36cess results in a physical invasion.
B. Noxious Use Test
The noxious use test holds generally that if a land use regulation
only prevents a harmful or noxious use of land, then a taking will not
result regardless of its impact.37 In Hadacheck v. Sebastian,38 for ex-
ample, the Supreme Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting the opera-
tion of a brickyard within certain specified boundaries 39 despite specific
findings that: 1) use of the land for making bricks was its most efficient
use; 2) when the landowner established the brick factory, the area was
sparsely populated; and 3) the value of the claimant's land was drasti-
34. Id. at 832.
35. Id. at 853-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
36. Unlike Loretto, the Nollan Court did not find that a physical invasion results in
a per se taking. Rather, the Nollan Court applied substantive due process analysis
under "heightened scrutiny," see supra note 21, to find the land use regulation invalid.
Whether Justice Scalia will apply heightened scrutiny to non-invasive land use regula-
tions is unclear. See Karlin, Back to the Future: From Nollan to Lochner, 17 Sw. U.L.
REv. 627, 670 (1988) (the reach of Nollan is unsettled). Justice Scalia, however, cites
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), to support his application of heightened
scrutiny. Agins involved a non-invasive zoning regulation.
37. See, e.g., Sibson v. State, 336 A.2d 239, 243 (N.H. 1975) (denial of permit was a
valid police power exercise denying a future harmful use, and, therefore, there was no
taking); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410-12 (1915) (it is not a taking when an
ordinance prohibits brickmaking in a designated region, even applied to one who owned
the brickyard before the municipality annexed it and where the land's use as a brickyard
was its most valuable use); City of Minot v. Freelander, 426 N.W.2d 556, 560 (N.D.
1988) (city's demolition of house because of structural deficiencies and unhealthful con-
ditions did not entitle homeowner to compensation). Compare State Plant Bd. v. Smith,
110 So. 2d 401, 406-07 (Fla. 1959) (when the state exercises its police power and de-
stroys decayed fruit, unwholesome meat or diseased cattle, no compensation is required)
with Department of Agric. and Consumer Serv. v. Mid-Florida Growers, Inc., 521 So.
2d 101, 104 (Fla. 1988) (when the state destroys healthy orange trees to prevent spread
of citrus canker, compensation is required).
38. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
39. Id. at 411-12.
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cally reduced.'
Traditionally, noxious use has meant a use of land that is deleterious
to the health and safety of others.4 1 Many courts have expanded this
definition by increasing the types of situations that the government can
regulate applying the noxious use test. Some situations may be only
marginally related to protection of health and safety. Specific examples
include: (1) upholding an ordinance banning off-site billboards for aes-
thetic and traffic safety reasons;' (2) upholding restrictions on land use
via zoning by applying the noxious use rationale;4 3 and (3) upholding a
"safety ordinance" which effectively prohibited a claimant from con-
tinuing a sand and gravel mining business that he had operated for
thirty years, notwithstanding indecisive evidence concerning risks
posed by excavation.'
Other courts, applying a noxious use rationale, have upheld land use
regulations that have nothing to do with health and safety. Examples
include: (1) upholding an ordinance imposing architectural restric-
tions;4 5 (2) upholding historic landmark preservation ordinances;4 6 and
(3) upholding the taking of a department store in order to develop a
well-balanced community.4 7
C. Balancing Test
Courts also use a balancing test to weigh the harm to the claimant
against the benefit to the public.4 8 In State v. Johnson,4 9 for example,
40. Id. at 405. Specifically, claimant's unrefuted testimony showed that the value of
the clay deposits fell from $800,000 to $60,000 as a result of the ordinance.
41. See BERGER, LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE 716-17 (3rd ed. 1983).
42. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 610 P.2d 407, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 510 (1980).
43. Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
44. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
45. State ex rel. Stoganoff v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970).
46. Penn Central Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
47. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
48. Some commentators view the balancing text as a consequence of Holmes'
Mahon opinion. See BOSSELMAN, CALLIES & BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 321 (Coun-
cil on Environmental Quality, 1973).
This takings test (balancing private harm against public benefit) is a singularly in-
defensible approach to takings analysis, and is not a consequence of Holmes' taking
formula. Presumably, in State v. Johnson, infra notes 49-53, if the public benefit were
greater, there would be no taking even though the landowners' interest would be com-
pletely destroyed. This is exactly the kind of government action that the just compensa-
tion clause was meant to prevent, and that Holmes recognized in Mahon. See supra
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the Maine Supreme Court held the Wetlands Act5° void as applied to
claimant's land. 1 Application of the Act to claimant's land deprived
the claimant of all reasonable use of it.52 The court balanced this dep-
rivation against the public interest in protecting wetlands. In the
court's view, this public interest failed to outweigh the private interest
because the wetland held by the claimant was "but a minute part ... of
[a] state-wide concern."53
D. Diminution in Value Test
The diminution in value test54 focuses strictly on the impact of the
land use regulation on the landowner. If the landowner's use is re-
stricted such that the value of his property is drastically diminished, a
taking exists no matter how great the benefit to the public. Before find-
ing a taking, some courts require that the regulation so restrict the use
of the property that it leaves no reasonable use.55 Other courts adhere
to a lesser standard, finding takings where the existing use is substan-
tially prevented.56 Whatever standard a court chooses to apply, it is
apparent that most courts allow substantial diminution in property
value before they will find that a regulation has "gone too far.",
57
note 18 and accompanying text. The public must pay for the benefit derived from the
landowner's loss.
49. 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970).
50. 12 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 4701-4709 (1964).
51. 265 A.2d at 716.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. The diminution in value test originated in Mahon, supra notes 14-18.
55. See, e.g., Arverne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 232, 15
N.E.2d 587, 592 (1938) (an ordinance that permanently so restricts the use of property
that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose is a taking); Agins v. City of Tiburon,
24 Cal. 3d 266, 277, 598 P.2d 25, 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 378 (1979) (a zoning ordinance
may be unconstitutional and subject to invalidation only when its effect is to deprive the
landowner of substantially all reasonable use of his property); Reel Enterprises v. City
of La Crosse, 146 Wis. 2d 662, 674, 431 N.W.2d 743, 748 (Ct. App. 1988) (a regulatory
taking requires that the restriction deprive the landowner of all, or practically all, of the
land's use).
56. See, e.g., Q C Corp. v. Maryland Port Admin., 68 Md. App. 181,208, 510 A.2d
1 101, 1115 (1986) (deprivation of the existing use is sufficient to demonstrate a taking).
57. See, e.g., HFH Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 512-14, 542 P.2d 237,
240-41, 125 Cal. Rptr, 365, 368-69, cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1975) (diminution in
value of land from purchase price of $388,000 to market value of $75,000 caused by
zoning ordinance was not a taking); Gold Run Ltd. v. Board of County Comm'rs., 38
Colo. App. 44, 45-47, 554 P.2d 317, 318-19 (1976) (no taking where developer sought
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The Supreme Court has applied an ad hoc approach to regulatory
takings claims since Mahor . 8 Often, the Court has quoted the view
that the just compensation clause is "designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." 9 This "dispro-
portionate burden" principle is the leitmotif of just compensation
clause analysis. It provides a background against which to critique
courts' decisions on the constitutionality of rent control laws.
III. RENT CONTROL AND TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
In the 1922 case of Block v. Hirsch,'° the United States Supreme
Court first upheld a rent control law against a landlord's taking chal-
rezoning of land from agricultural to residential, such rezoning took several years, and
in the meantime developer lost most of his property through foreclosure); William C.
Haas Co. v. City of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 1979) (no taking
where rezoning diminished value of land from $1,000,000 to $100,000).
58. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)
(no "set formula" used to trigger compensation for economic injury caused by public
action); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979) (regulatory "taking" determination
requires exercise of judgment and application of logic).
59. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). In Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), Justice Scalia stated for the majority that having
a publicly accessible beach may be a good idea, "but that does not establish that the
Nollans (and other coastal residents) alone can be compelled to contribute to its realiza-
tion." 483 U.S. at 841. In First English, supra note 13, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the majority, quoted the Armstrong "disproportionate burden" principle. 482 U.S.
at 318-19. In Keystone Bituminous Coal v. DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. 470 (1987), Justice
Rehnquist, in dissent, said that the taking clause prevents "the public from loading
upon one individual more than his just share of the burdens of government .... " 480
U.S. at 512. The majority, however, found that the Subsidence Act, which required the
claimant coal company to keep a certain amount of coal in the ground for surface sup-
port, merely abated a "public nuisance," and therefore was not a taking even though the
coal company was burdened uniquely. 480 U.S. at 491. See supra notes 37-47 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the "noxious use" test. In the rent control con-
text, this "public nuisance" exception to the "disproportionate burden" principle of
Armstrong is seen in Suppus v. Bradley, 101 N.Y.S.2d 557, 577-78 (N.Y. Spec. Term
1950) (rent control regulations are valid even though the burdens are borne dispropor-
tionately by landlords), aff'd, 278 A.D. 337, 105 N.Y.S.2d 48 (1951). For a criticism of
the view that rent control prevents a nuisance, see infra notes 162-167.
60. 256 U.S. 135 (1921). For a review of the case law on the constitutionality of
rent control preceding Block, see 11 A.L.R. 1252-1261 and 16 A.L.R. 178-80. In a
companion case to Block, Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921),
the Court upheld an emergency, temporary housing act similar to the rents act in Block.
Id. at 170-71. The rationale was similar, and the same four Justices dissented. It. at
198-200.
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lenge. In Block, the landlord sought possession of the premises after
expiration of the tenant's lease.61 Relying on the District of Columbia
Rents Act6" the tenant refused to surrender the premises. Section 109
of the Act granted tenants a qualified right to continue occupancy after
the lease expired.63 The Act was an emergency measure that was to
last no more than two years."M Congress sought to improve a crowded
rental market in Washington, D.C., caused by an influx of people dur-
ing World War 1.6' As such, the Court upheld the Act as a valid exer-
cise of the police power. 6
Applying substantive due process analysis, the Court reasoned that
preventing profiteering by landlords was a legitimate end. 67 Rent con-
trol and tenant occupancy privileges were a means reasonably related
to that end.63 The Court explained that the level of scrutiny applied
did not require that the means were necessarily the wisest, most cost-
effective, or even most likely to achieve the desired end.69
In reaching its conclusion, however, the Court recognized an impor-
tant restriction on the police power under the Hirsch facts. The Court
held that landlords were entitled to a "reasonable rent."'7 By implica-
61. IM at 153.
62. IM The complete title of the Act was: Act of October 22, 1919, c. 80, Title II,
41 Stat. 297, "District of Columbia Rents." Id. at 135, 153.
63. Id. at 153-54. Section 109 conferred upon tenants the right to continue occu-
pancy of rental property at the tenant's option, subject to regulation by the Commission
created by the Act, so long as the tenant paid the rent and met other rental conditions
established by the lease or the Commission. Id. This section also allowed the landlord
to take possession of the premises for occupancy by himself or his dependents if he gave
the tenant 30 days notice. Id. at 154. In Block, the landlord wanted the premises for
his own occupancy, but he did not give the required 30 days notice because he denied
the validity of the Act. Id.
The Act also conferred upon the Commission the power to determine whether the
rents charged and other conditions of leases were "fair and reasonable," and if not, to
adjust the rents or other conditions so that they were "fair and reasonable." Id. at 135.
64. Id. at 154.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 158.
67. Id. at 157-58.
68. Id. at 158.
69. Id. The court stated that "It was enough that the regulation bore a reasonable
relation to the end." Id. This statement typifies the Court's deferential treatment of
legislation under the low level scrutiny test. See supra note 21 for a discussion of the
levels of scrutiny courts apply under substantive due process analysis.
70. 256 U.S. at 157. The Court said that § 106 of the Act provided the procedure to
secure each landlord a reasonable rent.
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tion then, the Court would strike down a rent control law that de-
manded a cap on rent at a level that would be confiscatory to landlords
and would represent a windfall to tenants.71 A "just and reasonable
return" remains the standard today.72
The Block Court justified the regulation as a temporary emergency
measure.73 The Court stated that a permanent rent control regulation
would be a different case,74 although the Court did not go so far as to
say that a permanent rent control regulation would be unconstitutional
without compensation.75
In Bowles v. Willingham,76 the Supreme Court re-examined Block's
"reasonable rent" requirement. Once again, the country was at war.
Congress passed the Emergency Price Control Act of 194277 because of
rental housing shortages in areas where armed forces or war produc-
tion facilities were located.78 Section 2(b) of the Act delegated to the
71. Id at 157. The Court said that the act merely prevented landlords from "profit-
ing by the sudden influx of people .. .," an unjust pursuit. Id.
72. See, e.g., Parks v. Rent Control Bd. of Hazlet, 107 N.J. 217, 219, 526 A.2d 685,
686 (1987) (a fundamental requirement of a rent control ordinance is that it permits the
landlord a "just and reasonable return" on the property); Flynn v. Cambridge, 383
Mass. 152, 160-61, 418 N.E.2d 335, 340 (1981) (an ordinance regulating condominium
conversion of housing subject to rent control was not a taking because, inter alia, it
allowed the owner a "fair net operating income" for each unit); Baskin v. City of Berke-
ley Rent Stabilization Bd., 206 Cal. App. 3d 708, 713, 253 Cal. Rptr. 791, 796 (1988)
(constitutional standards require rent control laws to provide landlords "just and rea-
sonable returns on their property.").
73. 256 U.S. at 157.
74. Id
75. Justice McKenna, however, vigorously condemned the Court's "emergency" ex-
ception. Id at 169 (McKenna, J., dissenting). The dissent made what some economists
today call a supply-side argument:
Houses are a necessary of life, but other things are as necessary. May they too be
taken from the direction of their owners and disposed of by the Government? Who
supplies them, and upon what inducement? And, when supplied, may those who
get them under promise of return, and who had no hand or expense in their supply,
dictate the terms of retention or use, and be bound by no agreement concerning
them?
Id. at 161.
The dissent would have held that the Act violated not only the fifth amendment's just
compensation clause but also the Article I, § 10 provision that "No state shall... pass
any . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts ...... Id at 163-64 (citing U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10).
76. 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
77. Pub. L. No. 77-421, 56 Stat. 23 (repealed 1946).
78. See 7 Fed. Reg. 3193 (1942) (declaration by Administrator of the Office of Price
Administration that defense activities resulted in increased rents in designated areas).
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Administrator of the Office of Price Administration the authority to set
"generally fair and equitable" rents in designated areas.79 As such, the
Administrator issued a "Maximum Rent Regulation" establishing
maximum rents in these defense areas."0 A landlord challenged the
constitutionality of the Rent Director's order to lower her rents."1
The plaintiff distinguished Block's Washington, D.C., rent control
act. The Block statute allowed fair rental to each landlord, 2 while the
Bowles statute provided for "generally fair and equitable" rents in a
designated area.8 3 Such a scheme, the landlord argued, may be unfair
and inequitable as applied to a particular landlord. As such, the plain-
tiff argued that the Act was an unconstitutional taking as applied to
such landlords.84
The Court reasoned that fixing rents on an ad hoc basis would be
impractical, and consideration of this impracticality was germane to
the constitutional issue.8 5 Price control schemes by their nature may
reduce the value of property, but that does not mean the scheme is
unconstitutional.8 6 The Court cited previous cases where it upheld the
state's power to regulate prices, including schemes that established
price controls for a class of commodities or services.8 7 In stark con-
trast to the "disproportionate burden" principle of Armstrong v. United
States,8 8 the Bowles Court stated that a "member of the class which is
regulated may suffer economic losses not shared by others. His prop-
erty may lose utility and depreciate in value as a consequence of regula-
tion. But that has never been a barrier to the exercise of the police
79. 321 U.S. at 506 n.2.
80. Iat at 508.
81. Id. at 509-10. Besides a fifth amendment taking claim, the landlord challenged
the Act as an unconstitutional delegation of power and as a violation of fifth amend-
ment due process requirements. Id at 514, 519. The Court upheld the Act against all
these challenges. Id. at 516, 517, 519.
82. See supra note 70 and accompanying text for discussion of reasonable rent.
83. 321 U.S. at 516.
84. Id. at 516-17.
85. Id. at 517.
86. Id.
87. Id. See, eg., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (state had power to fix
the maximum and minimum price of milk); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876) (state
had power to set maximum prices chargeable by warehouses in a near-monopoly
situation).
88. 364 U.S. 40 (1960). See supra note 59 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the Armstrong "disproportionate burden" principle and its appearance in several impor-
tant 1987 Supreme Court taking clause cases.
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power."89 Thus, the Bowles Court effectively altered the "just and rea-
sonable return" standard of Block to mean that a blanket rent ceiling
will survive an "as applied" constitutional challenge if the rent ceiling
allows landlords generally to make a just and reasonable return.90
After Bowles, the Supreme Court did not again address the issue of
whether rent control laws constitute regulatory takings9 for forty-four
years.92 Many lower federal courts and state courts, however, have
89. 321 U.S. at 518.
90. In reaching its decision, however, the Bowles Court did not enunciate the limits
of the police power. In Mahon, supra note 14, Justice Holmes said that at some point, a
land use regulation "goes too far" and becomes a taking. Twenty-two years later in
Bowles, Justice Douglas, although finding no taking, suggested there were constitutional
limits to price-fixing legislation, but like Holes before him did not establish those lim-
its. As in Block, supra note 60, the Bowles Court considered the emergency housing
shortage addressed by the rent control statute. In so doing it suggested that such regu-
lation in peace time or in absence of an "emergency" may not pass constitutional mus-
ter. Block, 321 U.S. at 519.
Douglas seems to make the argument that the greater power includes the lesser when
he said that a "nation which can demand the lives of its men and women in the waging
of that war is under no constitutional necessity of providing a system of price control on
the domestic front which will assure each landlord a 'fair return' on his property." Id.
Following this logic, one may ask: what limits a government that can demand the ulti-
mate sacrifice of its citizens?
91. A 1947 case, Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, presented a chal-
lenge to the rent control provisions of the Housing and Rent Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1891-1910, on the grounds that the authority of Congress to control rents under its
war powers ended, and thus the Act became ineffective, after hostilities ceased. 333
U.S. at 140. See Proclamation 2714, 12 Fed. Reg. 1 (1947) (declaring a termination of
hostilities on December 31, 1946). Consequently, the claimant argued that the war
power upon which rests Congress's authority to control rents also terminated. 333 U.S.
at 140. See supra notes 60-90 and accompanying text for discussion about the Block
and Bowles cases, which held that the war power sustains the rent control provisions
Congress enacts in times of war emergency. The Woods Court upheld the Act, stating
that the war power extends beyond the time hostilities cease to reach the residual
"evils" of the war effort. 333 U.S. at 141-42. From a taking clause perspective, the
Woods case is of limited importance. It does make clear, however, that Block and
Bowles are based on wartime emergencies and should be, therefore, of limited preceden-
tial value in non-emergency cases. The concept of "emergency," however, expanded to
include any rental housing shortage. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
92. The paucity of rent control challenges from the mid-1950's until the early
1970's is easily explained; with the exception of some New York state localities, the
country was virtually free of rent control. See M. LEr-r, RENr CoNrROL 5 (1976).
Rent control on a national scale resurfaced in 1971 when President Nixon, as an anti-
inflationary measure, invoked a 90-day freeze on wages, prices and rents. Exec. Order
No. 11,615, Providing For Stabilization of Prices, Rents, Wages and Salaries, 36 Fed.
Reg. 15727 (1971). Several phases of stabilization measures followed, including a mea-
sure to restrict (with certain exemptions) rent increases to 2.5 percent plus specified
allowable cost increases. 6 C.F.R. Part 301 (1972). Although the national rent control
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addressed the issue because of the plethora of state rent control laws.93
Courts now generally hold that rent control laws are constitutional so
long as the laws represent an emergency response and allow the land-
lord a "just and reasonable return." 94 Courts are extremely deferential
to legislative or agency findings based upon these two factors.95 The
emergency need not be a war or similar disaster, but can be any per-
ceived rental housing shortage.96 If rent control itself exacerbates the
effort ended with the final phases of the stabilization program, numerous state and local
rent control measures preceded and followed these federal efforts. Exec. Order No.
11,695, Further Providing For Stabilization of the Economy, 38 Fed. Reg. 1473 (1973).
93. See M. LETr, supra note 92, at 5.
94. See, e.g., Bucho Holding Co. v. Temporary State Hous. Rent Comm'n, 11
N.Y.2d 469, 473-74, 184 N.E.2d 569, 571-72, 230 N.Y.S.2d 977, 980 (1962) (protection
of public against rent increases in a time of rental unit shortage is a valid legislative
purpose, although an unreasonably low return on landlord's investment, if shown by
landlord, would be "confiscatory" and unconstitutional); Kress, Dunlap & Lane, Ltd. v.
Downing, 193 F. Supp. 874, 878, 880 (D.V.I. 1961) (shortage of rental units justifies use
of police power to regulate rents, although a court must construe the statute fixing rents
so as to allow landlord a "fair and equitable return" for statute to be constitutional);
Niles v. Boston Rent Control Adm'r, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 135, 147, 374 N.E.2d 296, 303
(1978) (landlord failed to show that the rent adjustment provided by regulation did not
allow a "fair net operating income," and therefore the rent control rate was not confis-
catory); Leone Management Corp. v. Board of Comm'rs, 130 N.J. Super. 569, 578, 328
A.2d 26, 31 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974) (ordinance providing percentage ceiling on
rent increases based on Consumer Price Index was not per se unconstitutional). But see
Nash v. City of Santa Monica, 37 Cal. 3d 97, 106 n.6, 688 P.2d 894, 901 n.6, 207 Cal.
Rptr. 285, 292 n.6 (1984) (rent control does not give rise to a regulatory taking where
property retains some value).
95. See, e.g., Hotel Ass'n. of New York City v. Weaver, 3 N.Y.2d 206, 216, 144
N.E.2d 14, 19-20, 165 N.Y.S.2d 17, 25 (1957) (legislative enactment of State Residential
Rent Law is presumed constitutional, and evidence that 53% of hotels in New York
City have a 17.21% vacancy rate is not enough to rebut presumption that legislation
addressing the finding of a rental space emergency shortage is unconstitutional as ap-
plied to these hotels); Kahn v. Wall, 68 A.2d 862, 863 (D.C. 1949) (court was unwilling
to override recent Congressional extension of Rent Act by taking judicial notice of the
end of housing accommodations shortage); Warren v. City of Philadelphia, 382 Pa. 380,
384, 115 A.2d 218, 220 (1955) (rent and eviction controls designed by the state for the
"health and welfare of its citizens" is a valid police power exercise); Marshall House,
Inc. v. Rent Review and Grievance Bd. of Brookline, 357 Mass. 709, 714, 260 N.E.2d
200, 204-05 (1970) (state need show only a "reasonable basis in fact" that a housing
emergency exists to exercise its police power and control rents); Helmsley v. Borough of
Ft. Lee, 78 N.J. 200, 209, 394 A.2d 65, 69 (1978) (requiring only a "rational basis" for
enactment of rent control ordinance), appeal dismissed, 440 U.S. 978 (1979). But cf
City of Miami Beach v. E. J. Frankel, 363 So. 2d 555, 557 (Fla. 1978) (court held
invalid a proposed rent control ordinance where state's enabling legislation required a
showing of a "grave" housing emergency, and city council failed to make such a
showing).
96. See, e.g., Kress, Dunlap & Lane, Ltd. v. Downing, 193 F. Supp. 874, 878
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rental housing shortage,97 then a paradox arises such that the shortages
that rent control creates justify its continuation.
In Pennell v. City of San Jose,98 the United States Supreme Court
reiterated the view that rent control is constitutional so long as an
emergency rental housing shortage exists and the landlord receives a
just and reasonable return. The Pennell Court affirmed a California
Supreme Court decision upholding San Jose's rent control ordinance
against a fifth amendment taking claim.99 San Jose's rent control ordi-
nance allowed landlords an automatic annual rent increase by up to
eight percent. If, however, the landlord demanded an increase of more
than eight percent, a tenant could object. The ordinance required a
hearing officer to determine whether the proposed increase in rent was
reasonable under the circumstances. In determining whether the pro-
posed rent increase is reasonable, the hearing officer considers, inter
alia, financing costs, maintenance, service history and "the hardship to
the tenant.""l°°
The landlords' association argued that the tenant hardship provision
violated fifth and fourteenth amendment prohibitions against the tak-
ing of private property for public use without just compensation. They
argued that when the hearing officer reduces the rent increase based on
the tenant's hardship, the rent drops below the "reasonable" level. The
resulting reduction in the rent increase, argued the landlords, consti-
tutes a taking.1"1 Citing the Armstrong "disproportionate burden"
principle,1°2 the landlords argued that "although the purpose to be ad-
vanced by the hardship provisions (providing financial assistance to
poor tenants) is a proper one, that burden cannot constitutionally be
placed on individual landlords who happen to have hardship
(D.V.I. 1961) (shortage of rental units justifies use of the police power to regulate rents);
Apartment and Office Bldg. Ass'n of Metro. Washington v. Washington, 381 A.2d 588,
590 (D.C. 1977) (rent control act which is a legislative response to an emergency hous-
ing shortage was a valid police power exercise, even absent wartime conditions).
97. Economic theory and empirical data suggest that rent control causes rental unit
shortages. See infra note 131.
98. 485 U.S. 1 (1988), aff'g 42 Cal. 3d 365, 721 P.2d 1111, 228 Cal. Rptr. 726
(1986).
99. 485 U.S. at 15. The Court also upheld the ordinance against due process clause
and equal protection clause challenges. Ii at 11-14.
100. Id at 5.
101. Id. at 9-10.
102. See supra note 59 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Armstrong
"disproportionate burden" principle.
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tenants."
10 3
In an opinion which one commentator called a "judicial
nonevent,"'" Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, said
that the case was not ripe for consideration because the hearing officer
had not actually applied the tenant hardship clause to reduce a rent
below the amount it would have been reduced to pursuant to the ordi-
nance.'10 Although he did not reach the merits of the claim, the Chief
Justice reiterated his view that rent control laws are generally constitu-
tional because the end of "prevent[ing] excessive and unreasonable rent
increases" resulting from a rental unit shortage is a "legitimate exercise
of appellee's police power."' 106
In dissent, Justice Scalia criticized the majority for refusing to reach
the merits of the landlords' taking claim. Distinguishing "facial" chal-
lenges from "as applied" challenges, Scalia argued that where a facial
challenge exists the Court need not wait until the government misap-
plies the statute to reach the merits of the constitutionality challenge.
The question in a facial challenge is "whether the mere enactment of
the statutes and regulations constitutes a taking." 107
The dissent found the tenant hardship provision unconstitutional
under the Armstrong "disproportionate burden" principle. Public aid
to hardship tenants is a public function, argued the dissent, and there-
fore should come from general revenues, not from landlords or co-ten-
ants who happen to live in the same building as the protected class of
tenants.' 0 8
103. 42 Cal. 3d 365, 371, 721 P.2d 1111, 1115, 228 Cal. Rptr. 726, 730 (1986).
104. See Epstein, supra note 3, at 752. (Rehnquist's opinion that the taking issue in
Pennell was not ripe resulted in a "judicial nonevent.").
105. 485 U.S. at 9-10. For a criticism of Rehnquist's ripeness decision, see Epstein,
supra note 3, at 752 n.30 (there is no reason to wait for the misapplication of a facially
unconstitutional statute; this ripeness argument is an effort to quash constitutional tak-
ings challenges).
106. 485 U.S. at 9.
107. Id. at 15-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 19-23. Justice Scalia noted the political economy of rent control, stating
that:
The politically attractive feature of regulation is not that it permits wealth trans-
fers to be achieved that could not be achieved otherwise; but rather that it permits
them to be achieved "off budget," with relative invisibility and thus relative immu-
nity from normal democratic processes. San Jose might, for example, have accom-
plished something like the result here by simply raising the real estate tax upon
rental properties and using the additional revenues thus acquired to pay part of the
rents of "hardship" tenants. It seems to me doubtful, however, whether the citi-
zens of San Jose would allow funds in the municipal treasury, from wherever de-
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In Seawall Associates v. City of New York 109 the highest court of the
State of New York invalidated New York's "Single Room Occupancy"
(SRO) law110 as an uncompensated taking. New York City passed the
law in response to a shrinking stock of low-cost rental units. The law
prohibited owners of "SRO" properties from demolishing, altering, or
converting such properties. The law also obligated owners to restore
all such units to habitable condition and to leave them at controlled
rents.111 In Seawall, real estate developers challenged the law as an
unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation.112 The
court agreed, holding that the SRO law constituted a taking, under
both "physical invasion"' 113  and "disproportionate burden"
analyses.' 14
The court found a physical invasion in the city's forced control over
the owner's property; most importantly, the owner's right to exclude
others.115 Citing Loretto," 6 the court reasoned that the physical pos-
session need not be by the government, but may be by third parties
under government authority.11 7 In reaching its conclusion, the court
distinguished previous decisions which upheld rent control laws. The
court stated that:
The rent control and other landlord-tenant regulations that have
been upheld by the Supreme Court [e.g., Bowles] and this court
merely involved the restrictions imposed on existing tenancies
where the landlords had voluntarily put their properties to use for
residential housing .... [T]hose regulations [unlike the SRO law]
did not force the owners, in the first instance, to subject their
rived, to be distributed to a family of four with income as high as $32,400 a year-
the generous maximum necessary to qualify automatically as a "hardship" tenant
under the rental ordinance.
Id at 22-23.
109. 74 N.Y.2d 92, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1989).
110. Local Laws, 1987, No.9 of City of New York § 7.
111. 74 N.Y.2d 92, -, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1060-61, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542, 544 (1989).
See infra notes 130-31 and accompanying text for the argument that rent control con-
tributes to shrinking stocks of rental units.
112. Id at _, 542 N.E.2d at 1062, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 545.
113. Id at _ 542 N.E.2d at 1065-69, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 545-48.
114. Id at -, 542 N.E.2d at 1062-65, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 548-52.
115. Id. at , 542 N.E.2d at 1062-63, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 545-46.
116. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Loretto
case.
117. 74 N.Y.2d at -, 542 N.E.2d at 1063, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 546.
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properties to a use which they neither planned nor desired. 118
Once it determined that a physical invasion had occurred, the court's
finding of an uncompensated taking was nearly inevitable.119
The court went beyond the "physical invasion" rationale, however,
in holding that the SRO law was facially invalid as a "regulatory tak-
ing." In other words, the law failed the Armstrong "disproportionate
burden" analysis.120 The court found that the law failed both prongs
of the regulatory taking analysis: substantive due process analysis and
disparate impact on the landowner.121 Using substantive due process
analysis, the court found that the end of the SRO law-alleviating
homelessness-was of great social importance.' 22 Applying Nollan's
"semi-strict or heightened judicial scrutiny of regulatory means-ends
relationships,"123 the court found that the means to that important end
were inadequate. 124 The court relied on empirical evidence showing
that the law would do little to resolve the homeless crisis.125 Also, the
court found that the law was imprecise because the SRO units pre-
served by the law were not earmarked for the homeless or potentially
homeless and low-income families. 126 Finding that the benefits to the
homeless and low-income families were indirect, conjectural and did
not "substantially advance" the law's putative purpose, the court held
that the law was not justified.' 2 7
The court also found that, even if the law was "reasonable" and
passed the substantive due process inquiry, it could still be a taking
118. Id. at -, 542 N.E.2d at 1064-65, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 547-48.
119. See supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of the physical
invasion test and its accompanying review standard.
120. 74 N.Y.2d at _, 542 N.E.2d at 1065, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 548.
121. Id. at _, 542 N.E.2d at 1065-66, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 548-49. See supra notes 20-
22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the two-prong view of regulatory taking
analysis.
122. 74 N.Y.2d at -, 542 N.E.2d at 1068, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 551.
123. See supra note 21 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Nollan "semi-
strict" scrutiny of regulations under takings analyses.
124. 74 N.Y.2d at -, 542 N.E.2d at 1068-69, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 551-52.
125. Id. at - 542 N.E.2d at 1068, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 551. The "Blackburn Study,"
which reported on the status of SRO housing in New York City, supplied the empirical
data upon which the court relied. Apparently, this study acknowledged that a ban on
converting, destroying, and warehousing SRO units would do little for the homeless.
Id.
126. Id
127. Id. at _ 542 N.E.2d at 1069, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 552.
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because of the severe impact on the landowner's property rights.128
The court reasoned that the SRO law substantially impaired each of
the three basic rights of ownership: possession, use and disposal.12 9
The SRO law thereby deprived the landowners of the economically via-
ble use of their property.
IV. ANALYSIS
Economists agree that rent control laws exacerbate rather than im-
prove rental housing shortages.13 ° In a free market, a housing shortage
will cause a rise in rents as renters bid up the price of the limited hous-
ing space. The bidding up of rent forces some people to economize on
space, by doubling up and renting less space than one would if housing
were not in short supply. Also, rising rents provide an incentive to
homeowners to rent space previously off the market. Finally, higher
rents act as a strong stimulus to new construction of homes and apart-
ments. In sum, the price mechanism helps to bring about an equilib-
rium between the supply and demand of housing, as it does for any
128. Id at ., 542 N.E.2d at 1066-68, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 549-51.
129. Id
130. See Frey, Pommerehne, Schneider & Gilbert, Consensus and Dissension Among
Economists: An Empirical Inquiry, 74 AM. ECON. Rnv. 986 (1984) (more than 98% of
American economists surveyed agreed with the proposition: "a ceiling on rents reduces
the quantity and quality of housing available."). This consensus cuts across ideological
persuasions. For example Gunnar Myrdal, an architect of the Swedish Labour Party's
welfare state, said: "Rent control has in certain western countries constituted, maybe,
the worst example of poor planning by governments lacking courage and vision."
Rydenfelt, The Rise and Fall of Swedish Rent Control, in RENT CONTROL A POPULAR
PARADOX: EVIDENCE ON THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF RENT CONTROL 169 (1975).
Gunnar Myrdal is ideologically opposed to his 1974 Nobel Prize co-winner, Frederick
Hayek, but on rent control they agree. See Hayek, The Repercussion of Rent Restric-
tions, in PARADOX, supra at 80. Prof. Assar Lindbeck said: "In many cases rent con-
trol appears to be the most efficient technique presently known to destroy a city--except
for bombing." DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND RESEARCH, NAT'L. Ass'N. OF
REALTORS, RENT CONTROL: A NoN-SOLtrnoN 3 (1977). In Kristof, The Effects of
Rent Control and Rent Stabilization in New York City, in RENT CONTROL: MYTH AND
REALITIES 125 (The Fraser Inst. ed. 1981), the author interspersed pictures of rent
controlled buildings and bombed buildings and challenged the reader to guess whether
bombs or rent control caused the damage in each case. See generally INSTITUTE OF
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, VERDICT ON RENT CONTROL (1972) (the lesson from five coun-
tries and 50 years of rent control is that such policies do more harm than good); C.
BAIRD, RENT CONTROL: THE PERENNIAL FOLLY (1980). But see Atlas and Dreier,
The Phony Case Against Rent Control, THE PROGRESSIVE 26 (April, 1989). See also
Tucker, Where do the Homeless Come From, NAT'L REv. 32 (Sept. 25, 1987) (low
vacancy rates are characteristic of rent control).
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commodity.13 1 Rent controls destroy the price mechanism.
Rent control's failures, however, are not the basis upon which to
declare rent control laws a regulatory taking. Rent control would con-
stitute a taking even if it were an overwhelming success. The argument
proposed in the following section is that rent control laws are regula-
tory takings because 1) they violate the fundamental "disproportionate
burden" principle often quoted by the Supreme Court; and 2) they are
physical invasions, and thus are per se takings. Before making these
arguments, however, this Recent Development argues for the elimina-
tion of the substantive due process inquiry,"' even though such an
inquiry helps overturn rent control laws by allowing courts to consider
the failures of rent control.
A. Economic Substantive Due Process
Those who adhere to a "strict construction"
' 13 3 or "interpretivist ' 134
131. See generally C. BAIRD, supra note 130; Friedman & Stigler, Roofs or Ceilings?
The Current Housing Problem, in VERDICT ON RENT CONTROL, supra note 130, at 17.
In Swanstrom, No Room at the Inn: Housing Policy and the Homeless, 35 WASH. U.J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 81, 87 (1989), the author claims that housing supply, being a
"lumpy" and expensive good, is slow to respond to demand. Id. at 87. This unsubstan-
tiated statement is contrary to the results of a classic 1946 study by Milton Friedman
and George Stigler. See Friedman and Stigler, supra at 19-20. The authors compared
the San Francisco housing market after the 1906 earthquake with the same rental mar-
ket after rent control imposition in 1946. Within one month after the 1906 earthquake,
which destroyed one-half the housing stock, there were apartments and houses adver-
tised for sale or rent. People had "doubled up" and new construction began apace. In
1946, by contrast, the housing shortage was only ten percent, but rent control assured a
stagnant housing market and low vacancy rates. Advertisements by persons seeking
rental housing far outstripped advertisements by renters: the reverse of the 1906 experi-
ence. Ironically, Swanstrom, after blaming the market for a slow response to housing
shortages, says in the next paragraph that, because of massive government intervention,
a free market in housing is a myth. Swanstrom, supra, at 87. How can one say that the
market fails to respond to housing shortages when the market is untried? See Epstein,
supra note 3, at 749 ("[Housing] congestion is a transitory phenomenon for which the
regulatory cure is worse than the disease.").
132. See supra note 20 for a description of economic substantive due process.
133. "Construction" as applied to constitutional provisions refers to the drawing of
conclusions respecting subjects that lie beyond the direct expressions of the text, from
elements known from and given in the text. I W. CARRINGTON, COOLEY'S CONSTITU-
TIONAL LIMITATIONS 97 (8th ed. 1927). "Strict constructionists" advocate that courts
must apply without construction those constitutional provisions that are clear and un-
mistakable, and where construction is necessary - that is, where a constitutional provi-
sion is unclear - the court is to construe meaning by reference to the intent of the
framers, where discoverable, and other provisions within the Constitution. See Wright
v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 589 (1938) (a constitutional provision, which is positive
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theory of constitutional law, should oppose substantive due process
doctrine. The framers' intended "due process" to refer to procedural
rights. Substantive due process doctrine supplies activist judges with a
powerful tool to invalidate laws they dislike. Justice Black stated that
"there is no constitutional support whatever for this Court to use the
Due Process Clause as though it provided a blank check to alter the
meaning of the Constitution as written .. ."' Justice Douglas
agreed, stating that "[tihe Due Process Clause.. .has proven very elas-
tic in the hands of judges."' 3 6 Strict constructionists, in fact, condemn
substantive due process rationale when applied to non-economic issues
such as privacy, personhood and family.
137
Conservatives, however, generally disagree with economic regulation
and are therefore caught in a dilemma. Their laissez-faire, economic
philosophy leads them to support invalidation of much economic regu-
lation, such as rent control. Their strict constructionist philosophy,
however, leads them to oppose judicial activism. In the conservative
intellectual circle, the laissez-faire philosophy seems to be enjoying
somewhat of a revival, as many conservative leaders call for a revival of
and free from all ambiguity, must be accepted by courts as it reads, and no construction
is permissible). But cf Antieau, Constitutional Construction: 4 Guide to the Principles
and Their Application, 51 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 358 (1976) (the rule of construction
which demands that the intent of the framers be given effect is perilously difficult).
134. "Interpretivism," represented by Justice Iredell in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 386 (1798), is the view that "judges deciding constitutional issues should confine
themselves to enforcing norms" that the framers of the Constitution "stated or clearly
implied" in the text. "Noninterpretivism," represented by Justice Chase, is the view
that judges should go beyond the text of the Constitution and enforce norms that are
not discoverable within "the four corners of the document." J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST (1980).
135. Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 675 (1966) (Black,
J., dissenting).
136. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 384 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
137. See, e.g., C. WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW: FROM THE
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW 307 (1986) (characterizing
Roe v. Wade as "the most raw exercise of judicial power since Dred Scott."); Forrester,
Truth in Judging: Supreme Court Opinions As Legislative Drafting, 38 VAND. L. REV.
463, 476-77 (1985) (the abortion cases are based on the fiction that the novel rules
governing abortion are based on the due process clause); R. BERGER, FEDERALISM:
THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN 189 (1987) (we should direct our disaffection with the consti-
tution which the framers designed to the amending process of article V, not the judici-
ary). Cf. M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 2
(1982) (the Constitution does not bind the court; the Court instead engages in non-
interpretive review, applying its own values and making policy).
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Lochner era economic substantive due process.13
Those who remain true to strict-constructionist views attack Loch-
ner on several grounds. As previously discussed, substantive due pro-
cess allows courts to exercise powers that the due process clauses never
conferred upon the judiciary. The doctrine allows the courts to sup-
plant the legislatures. As such, courts perform as "super-legislatures"
accepting economic regulations which the majority likes, and invalidat-
ing those they do not like. Courts are ill-equipped to make decisions
about the need for and impact of economic regulations. As strict con-
structionists argue, these decisions are better left to elected officials and
administrative agencies.
For example, in Seawall Associates v. City of New York,139 the New
York Court of Appeals struck down the city's Single Room Occupancy
Law on a substantive due process ground." Relying on data which
showed the law's ineffectiveness in increasing available low-cost hous-
ing, the court struck it down because it did not "substantially advance"
the legitimate purpose.141 By invalidating the SRO law on the basis of
empirical data, the court substituted its judgment for that of the
legislature.
As more courts apply substantive due process rationale, they may
138. See, eg., Siegan, The Constitution and the Protection of Capitalism, in How
CAPITALISTIC IS THE CONSTITUTION 106, 126 (1982) (advocating a reinvigorated eco-
nomic substantive due process test in which only those economic regulations that fur-
ther compelling government interests are constitutional); Wonnell, Economic Due
Process and the Preservation of Competition, I1 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 91, 93 (1983)
(regulations restricting entry to an occupation must be "necessary to further a state
interest of overriding importance to be constitutional"); W. WILLIAMS, THE STATE
AGAINST BLACKS 125-40 (1982) (advocating the return of Lochner-era constitutional
laissez-faire doctrine in which courts invalidated economic regulations on substantive
due process grounds); Karlin, supra note 36, at 670-71 (Scalia's "heightened scrutiny"
in Nollan restored importance to the just compensation clause). Some commentators
advance arguments against distinguishing economic and civil rights, and thereby grant
economic rights the same protection as personal rights. See, e.g., McCloskey, Economic
Due Process and the Supreme Court. An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT.
REV. 34, 46 (to most people, economic rights such as freedom of occupation are at least
as important as personal rights such as freedom of speech); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 637 (3rd ed. 1986) (government control over livelihood may stifle
dissent); B. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIWERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 251 (1980) (those
dependent on government economic support are not likely to criticize their
benefactors).
139. 74 N.Y.2d 92, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1989). See supra notes
109-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of Seawall.
140. Id. at _, 542 N.E.2d at 1068-69, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 551-52.
141. Id. at -, 542 N.E.2d at 1068, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 551.
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overturn more rent control laws, particularly if they apply the Nollan
Court's heightened scrutiny analysis.142 A reinvigorated economic
substantive due process doctrine, however, is not an attractive ap-
proach to overturning rent control laws for the reasons already
stated. 143 A better approach is to reinvigorate the just compensation
clause by revealing the shortcomings of the various tests courts use to
determine whether a regulatory taking has occurred. For example, the
just compensation clause does not say that, if the government interest
outweighs the private interest, then government can destroy the private
interest without compensation. Yet that is exactly what the balancing
test 144 approach says. The just compensation clause does not say that
government can impair the value of property for a public purpose so
long as the property's value is not completely destroyed. Yet that is
exactly how courts apply the diminution in value test.145 The just
compensation clause holds that government may take property for a
public purpose, whether the purpose is compelling, important or
merely legitimate. But the just compensation clause also holds that
when government takes property it shall pay the deprived property
owner compensation, whether the value of the interest taken is small,
moderate or substantial. The other tests imply that a "good" or "im-
portant" public purpose defeats the obligation to compensate the de-
prived property owner. They hold that so long as the regulation is
"reasonable" no taking exists. This view is antithetical to takings juris-
prudence and the clear reading of the just compensation clause.
B. Rent Controls: A Disproportionate Burden
Rent control laws violate the fundamental purpose of the just com-
pensation clause by placing a disproportionate burden on landlords.
Through rent control, government attempts to prevent homelessness
and to protect low and fixed-income tenants by taking the landlord's
142. See supra note 21 for a discussion of the Nollan Court's heightened scrutiny
application. See also Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 814 (2d Cir. 1973)
(heightened scrutiny requires that the means are in fact substantially related to the ends,
not just reasonably or theoretically related).
143. For a contrary point of view, see Karlin, supra note 36, at 670-71 (Scalia's
heightened scrutiny of the land use regulation in Nollan restored importance to the
takings clause and restored judicial control over legislative outbursts).
144. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of the balancing
test in regulatory takings analyses.
145. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the diminu-
tion in value test.
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leasehold interest and transferring it to the tenant. Rent control stat-
utes compel landlords to convey a leasehold to a tenant for additional
terms of years at government-fixed, below-market prices. 146 Conse-
quently, landlords bear the costs of these government programs that, in
fairness, the public as a whole should bear.
Some courts apply a "noxious use""147 rationale to construe an excep-
tion to the disproportionate burden principle.14 Under this rationale,
landlord "profiteering" when rental unit supply is short is a noxious
use of land similar to pollution, excessive noise, or some form of pri-
vate misconduct causing a nuisance. Rent control prevents this nox-
ious use, and is thereby relieved of the disproportionate burden
restraint. Noxious use, however, was traditionally applied to situations
involving health and safety threats, and only recently did courts ex-
pand it to include aesthetic concerns.
149
One commentator asks: "How are health and safety improved if the
landlord is stripped of the financial resources that are necessary to
comply with applicable health and safety regulations?"' 5 This ques-
tion makes the cogent point that the means of rent control are not
rationally related to the legitimate ends of protecting health and safety.
Because this Recent Development has already rejected the substantive
due process rationale, 51 it now argues instead that a rent increase in a
competitive market is never a noxious use. 52
The view that rent increases during times of rental unit shortages are
146. See Epstein, supra note 3, at 744-45 for an explanation of the property interest
that rent control takes.
147. See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of the noxious
use test.
148. See, eg., Suppus v. Bradley, 101 N.Y.S.2d 557, 577-78 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1950)
(rent control regulations are valid even though the burdens are borne disproportionately
by landlords).
149. See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text for cases applying the noxious
use doctrine to health and safety concerns, and other cases applying the doctrine to
aesthetic concerns.
150. See Epstein, supra note 3, at 747-48.
151. See supra notes 133-43 and accompanying text for the argument that economic
substantive due process should be abandoned. This argument is not a criticism of Pro-
fessor Epstein's point. It is simply an argument that, in a judicial forum, the substantive
due process rationale is a tool that should be unavailable to judges. The author supports
the use of substantive due process rationale-that is, arguing that rent control is neither
rationally related to, nor substantially advances, any legitimate government purpose-
in the public forum and in regulatory and legislative proceedings.
152. In all fairness, Professor Epstein also makes this point. See Epstein, supra note
3, at 747 ("[Tlhe rent control statutes are not directed towards private misconduct, or
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a noxious use of land would expand the noxious use doctrine beyond
any meaningful bounds. For example, it would not be a noxious use of
land when a farmer raises the price of crops following a summer
drought which reduces crop yield. This theory effectively holds that
one who provides an essential good may not raise the price of that good
in response to the law of supply and demand. But where is the private
misconduct when a seller raises the price of a commodity and a willing
buyer agrees to purchase at that price? The noxious use doctrine pre-
vents a landowner from using the land in a manner that endangers his
or her neighbors, or adversely affects the value of their lands. A rent
increase does not threaten the neighbors' life, health or property value.
C. Rent Control As A Physical Invasion
As stated above, the typical rent control law compels the landlord to
convey to the tenant a lease renewal at a controlled price.153 The pur-
pose of this conveyance is to provide security of tenure to the occupy-
ing tenant. Without such a conveyance, the landlord would probably
not renew leases because most rent control laws include some form of
vacancy decontrol.' 54 The effect of this involuntary conveyance is an
authorization by the government for one to occupy the private prop-
erty of another. Therein lies the physical invasion.' 55
The rationale of Loretto and Nollan lead a fortiori to the conclusion
that a forced conveyance of the leasehold is a "physical invasion."
Loretto held that a government-authorized permanent physical occupa-
tion15 6 is a taking regardless of the public purpose.'5 7 Forced lease-
toward the amorphous concerns of public beautification. ... or even towards the health
and safety of tenants as a class.").
153. See Id. at 744-45.
154. See Baar, supra note 1, at 826-29 for a discussion of the types of vacancy de-
control provisions. Basically, vacancy decontrol provisions allow a landlord to set the
initial rent for a new tenant without controls, or with minimal controls. Id. at 826.
Vacancy decontrol provisions are politically attractive because they are satisfying to
landlords, and tenants are not particularly vehement in opposition because they will not
face the impact of vacancy decontrol so long as they don't move. Id at 829.
155. See supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of the physical
invasion test as used in regulatory takings
156. 458 U.S. 419, 427 (1982). The Court distinguished "permanent" physical oc-
cupations and "temporary" physical invasions, the former being per se takings, the lat-
ter being a factor in a taking analysis, but not determinative. 458 U.S. at 434. In
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), the Court upheld a state
constitutional requirement that shopping center owners permit individuals to picket and
exercise petition rights on their property, which was already open to the general public.
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hold conveyances represent substantial amounts of landowner's space
and serious interferences with the landowner's use of the land. They
differ substantially from the trivial interferences that the Court found
to be a taking in Loretto. 58 The Loretto Court described property
rights as the right "to possess, use and dispose of .... . 1 59 The forced
leasehold conveyance destroys each of these rights. The landlord has
no right to possess the rental unit and no power to exclude the tenant.
According to Loretto the owner may have "the bare legal right to dis-
pose of the occupied space by transfer or sale, [but] the permanent oc-
cupation of that space by a stranger will ordinarily empty the right of
any value, since the purchaser will also be unable to make use of the
property."'6' Ironically, the Court cited Bowles and Block to support
the contention that Loretto does not upset the state's power to regulate
the landlord-tenant relationship without compensating for every eco-
nomic injury caused thereby.1 6 1 In effect, the Loretto Court argues
that a trivial physical invasion is a taking no matter how important the
government purpose. But the substantial physical invasion caused by a
forced leasehold conveyance is not a taking.
The Nollan 162 Court found that a permanent physical occupation
Because the physical invasion in PruneYard was temporary and limited in nature, and
because the owner had not exhibited an interest in excluding all persons from the prop-
erty, "the fact that [the solicitors] may have 'physically invaded' [the owners'] property
cannot be viewed as determinative." Id. at 84. The Court said that the owners were
also free to restrict the solicitors' activities to minimize interference with the owners'
commercial functions. A forced leasehold conveyance is easily distinguishable from the
"temporary" physical invasions of PruneYard. The physical invasion by a tenant in an
involuntary leasehold is not limited in nature; it continues so long as the tenant pleases.
A rental unit is not a "public forum" to which the landowner has invited the tenant for
an indefinite period; the original lease most likely included a duration term, thus exhib-
iting a right of the landlord to retain a reversionary interest. Finally, unlike PruneYard,
the landlord cannot regulate the tenants' activities so as not to interfere with the land-
lord's commercial interest; the leasehold is the commercial interest.
157. 458 U.S. 419, 432-33 and n.9 (1982).
158. Id. at 430. See also Lovett v. West Virginia Central Gas Co., 65 W. Va. 739,
65 S.E. 196 (W. Va. 1909) (laying a gas line on claimant's land was a taking regardless
of minimal impact); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Webb, 393 S.W.2d 117, 121 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1965) (land is taken to the extent it is invaded, though no land was actually taken,
by installing underground cable).
159. 458 U.S. at 435 (quoting United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373,
378 (1945)).
160. Id. at 436.
161. Id. at 440.
162. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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had occurred when the government authorized the public easement
across the landowner's ocean-front property. 63 Although the Court
found that a taking had occurred, it did not find a per se taking as had
the Loretto Court. Instead, the Court adopted substantive due process
analysis, using heightened scrutiny, to find that granting an easement
along the ocean-front did not "substantially advance" the state's legiti-
mate purpose in providing visual access to a public beach.1 Applying
the same substantive due process rationale to rent control would allow
the Court to examine evidence of the failure of rent control. Rent con-
trol could pass low level scrutiny. That is, one could argue that rent
control is a rational, though perhaps not the wisest or least onerous,
approach to the problems of rental unit shortages. Heightened scru-
tiny, however, would require a showing that rent control actually does
substantially advance legitimate state interests. 165 The evidence of rent
control's failures would present a strong case against the proposition
that these laws substantially further the public purpose. 166
V. CONCLUSION
This Recent Development has proposed an analysis of rent control
laws which radically departs from the conventional judicial interpreta-
tion. It proposes that the courts finally lay to rest economic substan-
tive due process, a doctrine on the critical list for 50 years, but which
has enjoyed a surprising revival in Nollan. It also proposes that the
courts view rent control laws as effecting physical invasions of land-
owners' property interests, and, as such, constitute per se takings. The
fundamental purpose of the takings clause is to prevent government
from imposing a burden upon a few which it should in fairness impose
on the public. Rent control laws violate this fundamental purpose.
Although rent control is a demonstrated failure, the taking clause does
not turn upon the wisdom or success of the government's means. Even
163. Id. at 832.
164. Id. at 834-42 and 834 n.3.
165. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. Recall that the Seawall Court, ap-
plying substantive due process doctrine with heightened scrutiny, used data from a
study showing that the Single Room Occupancy law would likely fail in its objective of
preserving low-income housing to find that the law was a regulatory taking.
166. See supra note 145.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol38/iss1/14
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if rent control were a resounding, unqualified success, it would still
constitute a taking.
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